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Abstract. We explore the severity of an ongoing dispute over a productive resource within
a country that participates in world trade. In addition to arming, the contending groups in
our setting choose either to engage in destructive conflict or to settle their dispute peacefully.
Our central objective is to characterize the conditions under which the dispute might be
resolved peacefully instead of violently. The analysis underscores the intuitive roles played
by the destructiveness of open conflict and the salience of the future that have been identified
in the previous literature, but it also provides some novel insights into how world prices and
trade openness matter. Among other things, we find that, given conflict’s destructive effects
and time preferences, settlement is most likely to be supported as a stable equilibrium when
the “traditional” gains from trade are largest. However, there also exist circumstances under
which increased trade openness can induce destructive conflict.
JEL Classification: D30, D74, F10, F60.
Keywords: Trade openness, domestic disputes, resource insecurity, peaceful settlement, open
conflict, shadow of the future.
†We thank, without implicating, Elias Dinopoulos, Stergios Skaperdas and Tom Zylkin who provided
invaluable suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.
1 Introduction
Scholars of international relations have long debated the effects of globalization on conflict.
The classical liberal perspective emphasizes the opportunity costs of interstate conflict, ar-
guing that countries will be less likely to go to a war with others when that means sacrificing
the potential benefits of trade between them (e.g., Polachek, 1980).1 By contrast, the re-
alist perspective, emphasizing the anarchic nature of interactions between sovereign states,
argues that international trade augments incomes and military strength so as to possibly
amplify conflict (e.g., Waltz, 1979; Gowa, 1995). While the existing empirical evidence has
not resolved this debate,2 the increased incidence of intrastate wars in the post WWII period
suggests that more insight could be obtained by focusing on this type of conflict.3
This paper analyzes the severity of a dispute over a contested resource within a small
nation that trades in world markets, when that dispute is ongoing. Our central objective is
to characterize the conditions under which the dispute might be resolved peacefully instead of
violently. The analysis builds on the static model of domestic conflict within a small country
and international trade presented in Garfinkel et al. (2008).4 It views conflict as resulting
from weak institutions of property rights and enforcement. Disputes between groups over
the nation’s resources—for example, oil and minerals—induce those groups to arm so as to
take control of a larger share.5 But, departing from Garfinkel et al. (2008), the analysis
distinguishes between mobilization of resources to arm and the deployment of those arms in
open conflict, along the lines of Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) and McBride and Skaperdas
(2007, 2014).6
More specifically, once the contending groups have made their arming choices, they choose
how to resolve their dispute. One option involves violent or open conflict, modeled as a
winner-take-all contest, with some fraction of the nation’s remaining resources (after arms
have been produced) being destroyed as a result.7 The other option, supported by the
arms produced and the threat of open conflict, involves a peaceful division of the contested
1For an overview, also see Gilpin (1987, pp. 26-31).
2See, for example, Barbieri and Schneider (1999).
3Blattman and Miguel (2010) provide a comprehensive survey of the causes and consequences of civil wars.
4Our focus on a small country means that product prices are given exogenously. See Skaperdas and
Syropoulos (2001) who use a similar static framework, generalized in Garfinkel et al. (2015), to study global-
ization and interstate conflict. Dal Bo´ and Dal Bo´ (2011) study international trade and domestic conflict in
a different, though similarly static, setting.
5See Klare (2001) for an overview, including many examples of how disputes over resources can and have led
to conflict, both within and between countries. This sort of conflict is distinct from insecurity in trade where
weak institutions of governance can undermine the fulfillment of implicit or implicit contracts between trading
partners (e.g., Dixit, 2004 and 2015) or can induce parties to take protective measures against cheating or theft
by other parties (e.g., Anderson and Marcouiller, 2005) that are sufficiently costly to make trade undesirable.
6See Fearon (1995), Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996), and Powell (2006) for similar approaches.
7The destructive effects of civil wars (e.g., lost lives, damaged property, and so on) have been significant
(see Collier et. al. 2003).
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resource. Given whatever arms they choose, the contending groups always have a short-
run incentive to negotiate a peaceful settlement, for that option allows them to divide the
contested resource without having to deploy arms and incur destruction. However, when
the groups take a longer-run perspective, settlement need not emerge as a subgame perfect,
Nash equilibrium. The reason is that settlement in the current period concerns the division
of resources only in that period; absent the possibility for the groups to commit to a division
of the contested resource in the future, settlement requires some diversion of resources away
from the production of goods for consumption in the future as well as in the current period.
Open conflict in the current period, by contrast, gives the victor a strategic advantage in
future conflict, so that fighting today reduces future arming costs relative to those under
settlement. In fact, open conflict is always a subgame perfect, Nash equilibrium. Moreover,
depending on world prices, trade costs, the shadow of the future, and the degree of conflict’s
destructiveness, open conflict could Pareto dominate peaceful settlement.8
Our analysis characterizes the conditions that ensure settlement can also arise as an equi-
librium. Along the lines of the existing theoretical literature, our findings underscore the
intuitive roles played by the destructiveness of conflict and the salience of the future (or the
“shadow of the future”), with the former increasing the relative appeal of settlement and
the latter reducing it. For example, peaceful settlement is more likely to be Pareto domi-
nant, given the world price and trade costs, when conflict’s destructive effects are sufficiently
large and the shadow of the future small.9 Nonetheless, the Pareto dominance of peaceful
settlement over open conflict cannot ensure its emergence as another subgame perfect, Nash
equilibrium. An additional requirement is that settlement be immune to unilateral deviations
in arming and in the choice of peaceful settlement. Our analysis shows that settlement is
more likely to arise as a stable equilibrium under conditions that are generally stronger and
considerably more nuanced than those that ensure its Pareto dominance.
Moving beyond the existing theoretical literature, we also demonstrate how world prices
and trade openness or, more generally, globalization (captured, for example, by reductions
in trade costs) matter. First, they matter for payoffs given the method by which the con-
tending groups resolve their dispute. Here the influence is twofold: the direct, terms-of-trade
effect and the indirect effect that works through arming incentives. As expected, regardless
of whether the groups anticipate conflict or settlement or even when they consider a unilat-
eral deviation from settlement, an increase in the world price of the good that employs the
contested resource intensively increases the value of the contested resource relative to the
cost of producing arms, and thus amplifies arming incentives. Provided that the resource
8In such cases, open conflict is a “strong perfect equilibrium” or, equivalently (in the two player setting we
consider), a “perfectly coalition-proof” equilibrium (Bernheim et al., 1987).
9See McBride et al. (2014), who obtain a similar welfare implication in the context of litigation. This
result would also seem to follow from the analyses of McBride and Skaperdas (2007, 2014).
2
constraint in the production of arms is not binding, the wasteful diversion of resources into
arming expands with increases in that world price. This expansion occurs regardless of the
pattern of trade. Hence, given the method by which the groups resolve their dispute (i.e., set-
tlement or conflict), the introduction of trade, improvements in the country’s terms of trade,
and trade liberalization could be dominated in welfare by autarky for an intermediate range
of prices that make the country a net exporter of the good produced intensively with the
contested resource.10 However, because the magnitude of the wasteful diversion of resources
into arming depends on whether groups settle or fight, the pattern of trade itself depends on
how groups resolve their dispute. As such, a terms-of-trade improvement under, say, open
conflict could be a terms-of-trade deterioration under peaceful settlement.
Second, changes in world prices and trade openness affect the groups’ incentives for coali-
tional and/or unilateral deviations from settlement and thus can influence the incidence of
destructive conflict and/or peaceful settlement as well as welfare. Therefore, depending on
the rate of destruction and time preferences, an improvement in an economy’s terms of trade
could bring about a switch from settlement to open conflict or conversely, with its atten-
dant consequences for welfare. We find, for example, that as long as the groups value the
future, trade openness can induce destructive conflict; however, it is also possible that trade
openness helps to support peaceful settlement as a stable equilibrium, especially when world
prices differ substantially from the ones that would arise under autarky (i.e., precisely when
we expect the “traditional” gains from trade to be highest). As such, we find some theoretical
support for the two competing views in the international relations literature mentioned ear-
lier.11 More generally, our results reveal a complex relation between trade openness and the
risk of open conflict, depending on conflict’s destructiveness and the shadow of the future.
In what follows, the next section presents the basic model and derives some preliminary
results that allow us in Section 3 to study arming incentives under conflict and those under
settlement. Section 4 characterizes the welfare implications of these two modes of conflict
resolution, whereas Section 5 studies the conditions under which settlement is and is not a
stable equilibrium outcome. Section 6 examines the influence of trade openness on equilibrium
outcomes and payoffs. Finally, Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
10See Garfinkel et al. (2008) for a similar finding under non-destructive conflict.
11These findings are also consistent with the empirical evidence presented in Martin et al. (2008), but the
logic underlying our findings differs considerably from their interpretation of the evidence. Specifically, their
empirical analysis is motivated by two offsetting effects of trade openness on the risk of internal conflict: (i) a
deterrence effect that arises as internal conflict disrupts external trade and (ii) an insurance effect that arises
as internal conflict disrupts internal trade. Neither consideration is relevant in our analysis, since we do not
explicitly consider the potentially disruptive effects of conflict on trade.
3
2 Resolving a Domestic Dispute
The analysis is based on the model of domestic conflict and trade presented in Garfinkel et
al. (2008), with some simplifications, but extended over an indefinite time horizon. Consider
a country populated by 2 identical groups, indexed by i = 1, 2. In each period, the country is
endowed with two types of resources, land and labor, which can be converted on a one-to-one
basis into respectively oil and butter, two goods for final consumption. Each group i holds
L units of secure labor, which can also be used to produce guns (or arms), similarly on a
one-to-one basis. Let Gi denote group i’s level of arming or guns production. Then, L−Gi
(≥ 0) units of labor will potentially be available for the production of butter.12
The two final consumption goods, oil and butter, are produced under perfectly competitive
conditions. They can be traded domestically as well as internationally.13 Let Oi and Bi
denote group i’s consumption of oil and butter respectively. Each group i’s preferences take
the Cobb-Douglas form,
w(Oi, Bi) = (Oi)α(Bi)β, (1)
for i = 1, 2, where α ∈ (0, 1) and α+ β = 1.14
While the two groups hold secure claims on the goods they produce and on those they
exchange, as well as their respective labor endowments, they contest the country’s endowment
of land or territory, T .15 Each group would like to take control of the contested territory,
particularly for its oil. But, due to imperfect institutions of governance and enforcement,
claims to this territory can be resolved only in one of two ways: through open conflict (war)
or through “peaceful” settlement under the threat of open conflict (armed peace).
In the case of open conflict, guns determine each group i’s probability of winning the
dispute over T , qi = q(Gi, Gj) for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i. Let G = G1 +G2 denote the aggregate
quantity of guns chosen in the first stage of the current period. Then the probabilities are
12What we call “labor” can be more generally thought of as any secure resource held by the groups to
produce/finance arms. As will be become evident below, the constraint that L − Gi ≥ 0 plays an important
role in determining equilibrium payoffs.
13The assumption that goods can be traded domestically is not essential here, since there is trade with the
rest of the world. The analysis could be extended to capture the insurance effect of trade openness considered
by Martin et al. (2008), by supposing that internal conflict disrupts internal trade, and then compare the
incentives for groups to settle peacefully under autarky with those under trade. We expect the conditions
for peaceful settlement to be a possible stable equilibrium would be weaker under trade. As noted below, we
could also extend the analysis to consider the possible disruptive effects of internal conflict on external trade
and thus capture the opportunity cost of conflict that has been emphasized by the classical liberal view and
is also featured in Martin et al. (2008).
14Note that these preferences imply risk neutrality, which helps simplify matters as noted below.
15The analysis could be modified to suppose that only some fraction of the nation’s territory, say τ ∈ (0, 1],
is insecure, and that each group holds an equal share 1
2
(1−τ) securely. Assuming τ = 1 simplifies the analysis
without changing the results qualitatively.
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specified as follows:
qi ≡ q (Gi, Gj) = { Gi/G if G > 0
1/2 otherwise,
(2)
for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i. This specification implies that group i’s probability of winning is
increasing in its own arming choice, qi
Gi
> 0, and decreasing in the arming choice by the
other group, qi
Gj
< 0, j 6= i. Furthermore, it is symmetric so that when Gi = Gj = G ≥ 0,
qi = qj = 12 .
16 In the case that the two groups fight, some fraction denoted by 1− φ ∈ [0, 1)
of the country’s current-period land endowment and its labor endowment (net of what labor
has been used to produce guns) is destroyed.17 However, this destruction is temporary; the
nation’s resource endowments of land and labor return to their pre-conflict levels in all future
periods.18 Moreover, fighting today can bring with it future benefits, by virtue of its giving
the winner a strategic advantage in future conflict. To highlight this effect, we assume that
the winner of a conflict in the current period gains not only all of the contested land net of
destruction in that period (φT ), but also all of the nation’s land (T ) in each future period,
without having to produce any additional guns.19
By contrast, when the two groups settle their differences peacefully, the land is divided
according to a “split-the-surplus rule.” We denote this rule, which is derived below, by si for
i = 1, 2 where sj = 1− si. As will become evident, this rule, like the probability of winning
qi, depends on the guns held by each group. However, in the case of settlement, there is no
16See Tullock (1980) who first introduced this functional form, often referred to as the “contest success




j), assuming only that f(·) is a non-negative, increasing function. Finally, see Hirshleifer
(1989), who explores the properties of two important functional forms of this class, including the “ratio
success function,” where f(G) = Gm with m > 0. Note that the results to follow would remain qualitatively
unchanged under this more general specification with m ∈ (0, 1]. But, to maintain clarity, we focus in on the
specification in (2) where m = 1.
17As will become evident shortly, assuming that conflict destroys equal proportions of land and residual
labor endowments conveniently implies that the autarkic price is independent of the rate of destruction and
whether the groups fight outright or settle their dispute (see equation (7) below). This simplifies the analysis,
but does not alter the main insights.
18Another interpretation of 1− φ ∈ [0, 1), one that would be more consistent with the assumed temporary
nature of conflict’s destruction, is that the outbreak of conflict disrupts the productive process, making land
and labor less effective in yielding respectively oil and butter. In any case, while assuming that open conflict’s
destructive effects are temporary tilts the balance of our analysis in favor of conflict, this assumption could
easily be relaxed. In fact, as noted below, assuming instead that conflict’s destruction in permanent simplifies
the analysis considerably, while making some of our central results stronger.
19The assumption that the victor takes control of all of the nation’s land forever is not innocuous. Indeed,
nothing in our model specification prevents the loser of the contest in the current period from initiating conflict
in future periods; if this were possible, conflict could induce higher future resource costs, thereby wiping out
the basis for conflict’s potential appeal relative to settlement. What we have in mind here is that defeat in
conflict undermines the loser’s capacity, organization and possibly even its will to enter into conflict in the
future. Put differently, one could view conflict as crippling the losing group’s ability to fight in the future. An
alternative assumption would be that the loser is simply eliminated. Although this more dramatic assumption
could make conflict less appealing, we suspect that it would not change the analysis in a substantive way.
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destruction of resources. Nevertheless, the two groups find themselves in the same struggle
over the nation’s land resources once again in the following period.
The timing of actions in the first period is as follows:
Stage 1. Each group i chooses its allocation of labor to arming, Gi, taking the other group’s
decision, Gj j 6= i, as given.
Stage 2. Given those arming choices (Gi for i = 1, 2), the groups enter into negotiations
about how to divide the contested land.
(2.a) If both groups agree on a division, they share the contested land accordingly. Each
group i then produces siT units of oil and max
[
L−Gi, 0] units of butter.
(2.b) Otherwise, their negotiations end in conflict, with the winner taking the entire land
endowment net of damages induced by the war, φT , leaving no land for the other
group. In addition, each group’s labor endowment net of what had been absorbed
into arming is partially destroyed, leaving only φ(L − Gi) units of labor for each
group to produce butter in that first period.
Stage 3. Given the production of butter and oil by both groups, competitive trade takes
place with the outside world, at prices that the groups treat as exogenous.
What happens beyond the first period depends on whether the two groups settled peace-
fully or fought in the first. In the case of peaceful settlement in the initial period, the three
stages specified above are repeated in the next period. In the case of open conflict, the winner
takes all of the contested land in the second period and every period after that, and no labor
resources are allocated to arming after the initial period.
Analyzing the two alternative methods of “resolving” the conflict and their implications
for equilibrium arming requires that we first derive the current-period payoffs given the
groups’ arming choices made in stage 1 and contingent on the outcome of their dispute in
stage 2. These contingent payoffs are based on the indirect utility functions implied by (1).
Denote group i’s land holdings, contingent on what happens in stage 2 and given the arming
choices in stage 1, by T̂ ki, where k = c when the groups engage in open conflict and k = s
when they settle. From our previous description, these quantities are given by
T̂ ki =
{
T θ̂iφ if k = c
Tsi if k = s,
(3)
for i = 1, 2, where θ̂i is an indicator variable, taking on the value of 1 in the case that group
i wins the open conflict and the value of 0 otherwise. Clearly, Prob(θ̂i = 1) equals q(Gi, Gj).
Now, normalize the price of butter to 1, and let p denote the internal or domestic relative
price of oil measured in units of butter faced by the country. Assuming that trade costs
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are zero, that price equals the world price. More generally, in the presence of trade costs,
that price could differ from the world price as discussed below. In any case, the production
structure specified above implies further that the prices of both guns and labor equal 1.
We can then write group i’s contingent one-period income or revenue function as
R̂kiJ ≡ R(p, T̂ ki, L−Gi) =
{ [
pT θ̂i + L−Gi
]
φ if k = c
pTsi + L−Gi if k = s,
(4)
for i = 1, 2, j 6= i. Abstracting from international transfers of income, group i’s total
expenditure on butter and oil must be equal to this measure of income. Then, its contingent
current-period indirect utility function implied by (1) can be written as




pT θ̂i + L−Gi
]
φ if k = c
µ(p)
[
pTsi + L−Gi] if k = s, (5)
for i = 1, 2 j 6= i, where µ(p) = ββ(α/p)α represents the groups’ (common) marginal utility of
income. Using Roy’s identity, one can verify that group i’s contingent current-period demand
and supply functions for oil are respectively αR̂kiJ /p and T̂
ki; therefore, its excess demand




− T̂ ki, (6)
for k = c, s and i = 1, 2, which is positive if the group demands (imports of) oil in the world
market and negative if the group supplies (exports of) oil.




the market-clearing price that would prevail in the country if it were closed off entirely to




Using equations (3), (4) and (6) and letting L ≡ 2L denote the aggregate quantity of labor
in the country, one can verify the following:








As this expression shows, pA does not depend on whether the two groups settle or fight,
since conflict’s destructive effects equally impact both land and labor net of that allocated
to arming. Moreover, equation (7) shows that the autarkic price does not depend on the
distribution of labor, land or even guns across groups. Instead, it depends only on aggregate
quantities. Note especially that, when more of the country’s aggregate labor endowment is
allocated to arming (G), the amount of butter produced domestically necessarily falls; hence,
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as equation (7) shows, pA depends negatively on G.
20 For future reference, let pnA denote the
autarkic price when no guns are produced. From (7), pnA =
α
βL/T .
3 Expected Payoffs and the Incentives to Arm
With these preliminary results, we now derive the expected current and future discounted
payoffs under open conflict and settlement given the arming choices made by the two groups
in the first stage of the first period. With these payoff functions, we characterize the groups’
arming incentives.
3.1 Open Conflict
Let ui denote group i’s current-period expected payoff under conflict given the quantity of
arms chosen by both groups. Since the current-period indirect utility function contingent on
the outcome of the conflict, (5) for k = c, depends linearly on the group’s contingent land
and labor holdings, group i’s expected current-period payoff under conflict, given the guns
choices by both groups, can be written as a function of group i’s expected land and labor
holdings:
ui = ui(Gi, Gj ; p) = µ(p)
[
pTq(Gi, Gj) + L−Gi]φ, (8)
for i = 1, 2, j 6= i.
Now let U i denote the group’ i’s expected lifetime payoff under conflict and δ ∈ [0, 1)
denote the groups’ common discount factor. For convenience, we define ∆ ≡ δ/(1−δ) ∈ [0,∞)
as the shadow of the future. Since the winner of the conflict takes control of all of the disputed
land in each future period (i.e., T ) with no subsequent destruction and since no resources
are devoted to the conflict in future periods regardless of who wins, we can write group i’s
expected lifetime payoff as a function of current guns and the current and future relative price
of oil. To keep matters simple, we assume that the future relative price equals the current
relative price.21 Thus, we have
U i(Gi, Gj) = ui(Gi, Gj ; p) + ∆
[
µ(p)(pT¯ q(Gi, Gj) + L)
]
, (9)
for i = 1, 2, j 6= i. The dependence of this payoff on the first-stage arming choices by
both parties works through the conflict technology q(Gi, Gj) that enters both the current-
20This property holds under more general production structures where both consumption goods and guns
are produced with the two factor inputs, as long as guns production is sufficiently labor intensive relative to
the country’s labor-land endowment ratio (see the Supplementary Appendix of Garfinkel et al., 2008).
21One could extend the analysis to study how changes in the future price—due to, for example, an anticipated
trade liberalization or anticipated advances in technology that reduce future trade costs—affect current first-
and second-stage decisions.
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period expected payoff and the discounted future expected payoff. Recalling that qi
Gi
> 0,
a comparison of the expression above with (8) shows that a group’s incentive to arm in this
multi-period setting is greater than what it would be in a one-period game.
Turning to those incentives, differentiation of this expected payoff with respect to Gi,





(pTqiGi − 1)φ+ ∆pTqiGi
]
, (10)
for i = 1, 2. The first term in the square brackets represents the current marginal benefit
(measured in units of butter) of arming, due to its impact on the probability of capturing
the entire land resource after destruction in that period, net of the current resources diverted
from the production of butter to the production of guns and net of the destruction that
accompanies open conflict. The second-term represents the future marginal benefit (again
measured in butter units) in terms of increasing the probability of securing the entire land
resource in future periods.
As can easily be verified, the specification of the conflict technology in equation (2) implies
that the amount of arming by both groups will be strictly positive. As such, the expression
in (10) when evaluated at the optimizing choices of arms assuming conflict will be non-
negative. However, depending on p, the labor constraint in the production of arms could




, one can show
that, in a symmetric equilibrium under conflict, group i’s arming choice is given by







= L ppic if p ≤ pic
L otherwise,
(11)
for i = 1, 2, where pic ≡ ( φφ+∆)2L/T denotes the threshold value of the price above which the
labor constraint in the production of arms binds.22 If this were a static, one-period game (or
equivalently ∆ = 0), the allocation to guns would be simply Gc = pT/4 for p ≤ 2L/T and
L otherwise. The second term inside the square brackets in the first expression on the first
line (∆/φ) reflects the added incentive to arm due to the possible benefit of capturing the
disputed resource in the future, a benefit that is larger when ∆ is larger. Thus, as the future
becomes more salient, Gc rises for p < pic. This term also reflects the positive influence of
conflict’s destructive effects (1 − φ) on arming incentives. This influence can be interpreted
as resulting from the effect of destruction in the current period to effectively make the future
22The resource constraint embedded in equation (11), that Gc ≤ L, is important as will become evident
below. For now, note that, if this constraint binds, the winning group specializes in the first period in the
production of oil, whereas the defeated group gets a zero payoff. We would not expect such specialization if
preferences were increasing and strictly concave in income.
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more relatively more important (analogous to an increase in ∆), and the increase in arming
can then be seen as an attempt substitute intertemporally. Finally, observe that Gc is also
increasing in the relative price of oil p for p < pic.
Since this arming choice is identical across the two groups for any p, qi = qj = 12 . Thus,
equilibrium expected payoffs under conflict are identical across groups, and can be written
as:
U ≡ U(Gc, Gc) = µ(p)[φ (L−Gc + 12pT )+ ∆ (L+ 12pT ) ], (12)
for each i = 1, 2 and all p, where Gc is given in equation (11). We return to characterize
this function more fully as it depends on the key parameters (p, φ and ∆), after deriving the
analogous solutions under peaceful settlement.
3.2 Settlement
Let vi denote group i’s current-period payoff under settlement given the quantity of arms
chosen by both groups. From (5) for k = s, we have
vi = vi(Gi, Gj ; p) = µ(p)
[
pTsi + L−Gi] , (13)
for i = 1, 2, j 6= i. To close the model, we assume that settlement involves an even split of the
current surplus or equivalently requires vi−ui = vj −uj .23 Since si + sj = 1 and qi + qj = 1,
we can write group i’s one-period payoff under settlement using equations (8) and (13) as
follows:
vi = ui(Gi, Gj ; p) + 12S, (14a)




[vi − ui] = (1− φ)µ(p)[pT + L−G] ≥ 0, (14b)
which is strictly positive for φ < 1. Not surprisingly, the surplus is increasing in the degree
of destruction (1 − φ) and decreasing in the allocation of labor to guns production.24 Note
that the one-period payoff shown in equation (14), in contrast to that under open conflict
23Alternatively, one might suppose that settlement involves an even split of the current and present dis-
counted value of future surpluses. See McBride and Skaperdas (2014) for such an analysis in a different
context. Our focus on an even split of the current surplus only keeps the analysis tractable, though it likely
induces a slight bias in the overall preference for fighting. Also, see Anbarci et al. (2002) for an analysis of
alternative bargaining norms in a one-period setting.
24Of course, it is possible that one group, say group 1, has some bargaining advantage in the negotiation
stage (given G1 and G2), in which case it would get a larger share, λ > 1
2
of the surplus S, leaving the
remaining, smaller share 1− λ for the other group. However, we abstract from that possibility here.
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shown in equation (8), is not subject to uncertainty.25
The implied rule of division is given by







for i = 1, 2, j 6= i. This rule is a weighted average of two components. The first component
is the share of the contested land if it were divided solely on the basis of the groups’ winning
probabilities. The second component is simply one-half adjusted by the groups’ relative guns.
The weights depend on the destruction parameter, 1 − φ. If fighting were to destroy all of
the nation’s land and labor (φ = 0), land would be divided solely according to this second
component. In this extreme case, if the two groups brought identical amounts of guns to the
negotiation table, then the contested land would be evenly split; but, if group i were to bring
relatively more guns, it would receive a relatively larger share.26 In the other extreme case
where fighting destroys no resources (φ = 1), the contested land is divided solely on the basis
of the groups’ winning probabilities given their gun choices.
Due to the static nature of the one-period game under settlement, the expected future
one-period payoff functions under settlement will be identical across time and equal to the
current one-period payoff function. Letting Gi′ for i = 1, 2 denote group i’s future optimizing
allocation of the labor endowment to guns and assuming as before that the future price relative
price of oil is equal to the current price, the expected discounted payoffs under settlement,
which we denote by vi, can thus be written as
V i(Gi, Gj) = vi(Gi, Gj ; p) + ∆vi(Gi′, Gj′; p). (16)
Observe group i’s current guns choice under settlement, in contrast to the case of open
conflict, affects only its current payoff. Thus, the incentive to arm in the current period in
anticipation of settlement is generally less than the incentive to arm in anticipation of open
conflict.








pTqiGiφ− 12(1 + φ)
]
, (17)
for i = 1, 2, j 6= i. The terms inside the square brackets represent together the net marginal
benefit of the group’s allocation of labor to arming under settlement, measured in units of
25Of course, if our specification for preferences means that uncertainty is not a central here. If preferences
exhibited risk aversion, then the surplus S would necessarily include some compensation for settlement’s effect
to make the outcome a certain one, in contrast to open conflict, as in Anbarci et al. (2002).
26Note that our analysis to follow rules out this extreme case, assuming φ > 0. But, if φ = 0, neither group
would have an incentive to arm.
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butter. An increase in guns by group i, given Gj , implies an increase in that group’s current
share of the disputed land according to the rule of division (15) as determined by the conflict
technology qi and a decrease in labor remaining to produce butter, both weighted by φ, as in
the case of conflict. In the case of settlement, however, there is an additional cost in terms
of a marginal reduction in the available surplus S shown in equation (14b). That added
marginal cost is reflected in the term 12 . Together with the absence of any future marginal
benefit of current arming, this added cost implies that each group has a smaller incentive to
arm under settlement than under open conflict, given the opponent’s arming choice and the
price.
As in the case of open conflict, the specification of the conflict technology in equation
(2) implies that the amount of arming by both groups will be strictly positive under settle-
ment. Hence, the expression in equation (17), when evaluated at the optimizing choices of
arms anticipating settlement, will be non-negative. Furthermore, depending on p, the labor
constraint in the production of arms could be binding, as in the case of conflict. Taking




, one can show that, in a symmetric
equilibrium under settlement, group i’s arming choice is given by








= L ppis if p ≤ pis
L otherwise,
(18)
for i = 1, 2, where pis ≡ (1+φ2φ )2L/T denotes the threshold value of the price above which the
labor constraint in the production of arms binds under settlement. Since arming is identical
across the two groups, we have qi = si = 12 for i = 1, 2. Observe that, similar to the case of
open conflict, this allocation of labor is increasing in the relative price of oil provided that
the labor constraint is not binding (i.e., p < pis). However, in contrast to arming under open
conflict, Gs is independent of ∆ and is decreasing in the degree of destruction (1 − φ) for
p ≤ pis.
Perhaps more importantly and as anticipated earlier, a comparison of the solution for Gs
in equation (18) with the solution for Gc in equation (11) shows that arming under open
conflict is at least as large as that under settlement: Gc ≥ Gs for any p. More precisely, note
that the binding labor constraint price under conflict pic can be no greater than that under
settlement pis: pic < pis for (∆, φ) ∈ [0,∞)× (0, 1]r {(0, 1)} and pic = pis = 2L/T for ∆ = 0
and φ = 1. In the special case where ∆ = 0 and φ = 1, Gc = Gs for all p. But, if either
∆ > 0 or φ < 1, then Gc > Gs for all p < pis and Gc = Gs for all p ≥ pis.
By virtue of the stationarity of this problem mentioned above, the solution for guns under
settlement shown in equation (18) applies to all future periods assuming settlement: Gi′ = Gs
for i = 1, 2. Thus, the groups’ equilibrium lifetime payoffs when they settle peacefully under
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free trade are identical.
V ≡ V (Gs, Gs) = µ(p)[(1 + ∆) (L−Gs + 12pT ) ], (19)
for i = 1, 2 and all p, where Gs is as shown in equation (18).
4 Equilibrium Payoffs and Welfare Implications
We now examine more carefully the equilibrium payoffs assuming conflict and the equilibrium
payoffs assuming settlement, based on the payoff functions in (12) and (19) with their re-
spective equilibrium solutions for arming (11) and (18). Although a central objective of this
paper is to understand the groups’ incentives to settle their domestic dispute given the first-
stage choice of guns in the initial period, here we characterize the equilibrium payoffs under
settlement and conflict when evaluated at their respective arming solutions. Such a char-
acterization allows us to explore the welfare consequences of the conflict/settlement choice,
assuming that they are possible equilibria. To be sure, open conflict is always a subgame
perfect, Nash equilibrium. If either group chooses to fight in the second stage, then open
conflict necessarily emerges. Anticipating that outcome and given the opponent’s choice of
Gj = Gc, neither group has an incentive to choose any other level of arms but Gi = Gc. In the
section that follows this one, we characterize the conditions under which peaceful settlement
is another possible subgame perfect, Nash equilibrium.
To proceed, it is useful to define pi0 ≡ 2L/T as the common threshold value of the price
under conflict and settlement (respectively, pic and pis) in the special, benchmark case where
δ = ∆ = 0 and φ = 1 that implies Gc = Gs = L. Using this definition, we can rewrite those
binding labor constraint prices for all feasible values of ∆ ∈ [0,∞) and φ ∈ [0, 1] respectively
as pic = pi0( φφ+∆) and pi
s = pi0(1+φ2φ ). Note that pi
c < pi0 for ∆ > 0 and pis > pi0 for φ < 1.
4.1 Equilibrium Payoffs under Settlement
For this part of the analysis, we start with the case of settlement, as this case is simpler to
analyze by virtue of its stationarity. With the definitions of pi0 and pis above and equation
(18), we can rewrite the equilibrium lifetime payoffs under settlement (19) as follows:
V =





if p ≤ pis





if p > pis,
(20)
where as previously defined pis = pi0(1+φ2φ ). Equation (20) shows that the equilibrium payoff
under settlement consists of two segments, V1 in the case that the labor constraint in the
production of arms is not binding (i.e., for p ≤ pis) and V2 in the case that it does bind (i.e., for
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p > pis). Recalling that µ(p) = ββ(α/p)α, one can easily verify that, ignoring the constraint




In addition, V2 is increasing in p for p ≥ pis. As such, the payoff V is strictly quasi-convex in
p, with a unique minimum at
pismin = min
[








That unique value depends on the value of φ relative to β/α. In particular, when φ ≤ β/α,
we have pismin =
α(1+φ)
2β pi
0, the minimum that corresponds to arg minp V1. Alternatively, when
φ > β/α, we have pismin =
1+φ
2φ pi
0 ≡ pis, the critical value of the price at which the payoff
function switches from V1 to the second segment, V2. Since φ ≤ 1, this minimum can obtain
only when α ≥ 12 or equivalently when oil is valued by relatively more than butter. But,
when α < 12 , pi
s
min always corresponds to the minimum of V1.
As one can easily verify using equations (7) and (18), the relative price of oil that elim-









similar to the finding in Garfinkel et al. (2008), each group’s payoff under settlement is mini-
mized at a relative price that exceeds the country’s autarky price; for p close to but above psA
so that the country exports oil, the gains from trade are positive but are dominated by the
losses due to arming; and increases in p further reduce each group’s payoff relative to that
under autarky provided initially p < pismin.
27 However, with increases in the relative price
above pismin (> p
s
A), the payoff under settlement rises. When pi
s
min < pi
s, this positive effect
emerges since, although the increase in p induces more arming, the implied increase in the
costs of insecurity are swamped by the increase in the gains from trade; further increases in
p above pis accelerate this positive effect on V , because the binding labor resource constraint
makes arming and thus the costs of insecurity independent of the price, leaving only the
additional gains from trade. This effect is similarly at play when pismin = pi
s and p rises above
pis.
The dependence of V on the relative price of oil is shown in Fig. 1 for various values of
the other parameters of interest. To start, consider the role of the shadow of the future, ∆.
Since Gs does not depend on ∆ and increases in ∆ raise the present value of future payoffs,
27To be more precise, when p = psA, the payoffs to each group under settlement and trade are identical to
those under settlement and autarky. As p rises above the autarky price, the gains from trade increase, but
these gains are swamped by the increased costs of insecurity. Note also, for p < psA, the payoffs to each group
under trade and settlement are greater than those under autarky and settlement, due to the gains from trade
and lower costs of insecurity. But, an increase in p (< psA) implies lower gains from trade and higher costs
of insecurity. While Garfinkel et al. (2008) focus on conflict, the results are similar to what we find here in
the case of settlement. This similarity is expected, since the case of conflict in that analysis abstracts from
destruction, and as such is analytically equivalent to the limiting case of settlement in the present analysis
when φ = 1 (i.e., si = qi).
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we have ∂V/∂∆ > 0 for any price. The independence of arming incentives on ∆ implies
further that pis remains unchanged with changes in ∆. Nor does ∆ influence pismin.
28 These
observations are captured in Fig. 1, by the upward shift in each family of curves (that vary
with φ) as ∆ rises from zero to some positive level. Specifically, given φ an increase in ∆
implies an increase in V , without affecting the critical points, pis and pismin.
The impact of an increase in the rate of destruction (i.e., a decrease in φ) on V is com-
plicated by its effects on both Gs and pis. A reduction in φ causes V1 to rise as it induces
less arming by both groups in the current and all future periods for p < pis: ∂V1/∂(−φ) > 0.
However, for p > pis, arming is constrained, and that makes V2 invariant to changes in φ.
Thus, for a given ∆, a reduction in φ causes V1 to shift up and as a result pi
s to rise, as shown
in Fig. 1. Notice the non-monotonic dependence of pismin on φ.
4.2 Equilibrium Payoffs under Open Conflict
Next consider the case when open conflict is anticipated. Using the definitions of pi0 and pic
and equation (11), the expected equilibrium lifetime payoff for each group under open conflict
in equation (12) can be rewritten as
U =
{















if p > pic,
(21)
where pic = pi0( φφ+∆) as previously defined. Like the equilibrium payoff under settlement, the
expected equilibrium payoff under open conflict consists of two parts. U1 is relevant when
the labor constraint is not binding in the production of arms, p ≤ pic; and U2 is relevant when
that constraint is binding, p > pic.
To explore the dependence of U on the relative price of oil p and the other parameters,
it is useful to consider these two components separately. A notable difference between the
payoffs under conflict and under settlement arises due to the fact that U2 (in contrast to V2)
need not be strictly increasing in p. More specifically, for values of p in the neighborhood of
pic, increases in p could cause U2 to fall: ∂U2/∂p|p=pic < 0. The reason for this possibility is
fairly simple. The cost of arming to a group is invariant to changes in the relative price of oil
when for pi > pic: Gc = L. Therefore, the effect of a change in p in the neighborhood of pic on
the group’s expected payoff would be due solely to terms-of-trade changes both in the current
and future periods. The sign of such changes depends on whether the group expects to be a
net exporter or a net importer of oil. Our focus here on the case where Gc = L implies that
each group will necessarily be a exporter of oil in the current period since there is no current
28Note that pismin = pi
s for φ = 1 and φ = φ′ < 1, but for the highest rate of destruction (φ = φ′′ < φ′),
pismin < pi
s. These latter points are indicated in the figure by the dot on the (highest) of the two families of
payoff functions corresponding to ∆ = 0 and ∆ > 0.
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production of butter. But, with no arming in future periods (whether the group wins or loses
the current-period conflict), each group could very well expect to be a net importer of oil in
the future. In this case, an increase in p will improve each group’s current terms of trade
(implying a positive effect on the current component its expected lifetime payoff), but the
increase in p will also worsen its future terms of trade (thus lowering the future component
of its expected lifetime payoff).29 If the rate of destruction is relatively high (small φ) and
the shadow of the future is also relatively strong, the net effect on welfare could very well be
negative.
The possibility that U2 can fall as p rises for p initially close to pi
c complicates matters a
little. To proceed, recall that µ(p) = ββ(α/p)α. Thus, as one can easily verify, U1 (without




0. By the same token, U2 (similarly without the restriction that p > pi
c, but









30 Building on these findings, one can show that U is strictly quasi-
































While the dependence of picmin on the parameters α/β, ∆ and φ is complex, the important
point here is that the minimum of U is unique.31
Fig. 2 illustrates the dependence of U on the relative price of oil p under alternative
values for ∆ and φ. Each panel assumes, for clarity, that picmin = pi
c. Consider first the
influence of ∆ on U . Inspection of (21) readily reveals that ∂U/∂∆ > 0 for all p; therefore,
the larger the shadow of the future, the higher is the expected payoff under conflict. When
there is slack in the resource constraint for arming initially, an increase in ∆ generates two
effects on the representative group’s payoff: a positive direct effect that raises the current
value of future payoffs and a negative indirect effect due to the implied increase in arming by
both groups, Gc. However, the direct effect dominates as ∂U1/∂∆ > 0 holds unambiguously.
When the resource constraint on arming binds, the indirect effect vanishes and we are thus
left with the direct positive effect, ∂U2/∂∆ > 0. Thus, as shown in Fig. 2a, U shifts upwards
as the future’s salience increases. Notice that, with this upward shift, the threshold value




Thus, a group’s future payoff will fall as p (> pic) rises if p < pnA initially.






31One special case merits some emphasis. In particular, suppose that δ = ∆ = 0 and φ ∈ (0, 1]. Then,
α > 1
2
implies picmin = pi
c. By contrast, if α ≤ 1
2




of the price above which the labor constraint binds (pic) increases, in contrast to the case of
settlement, because the increase in ∆ augments the incentive to arm only under conflict.
Next, consider the importance of the rate of destruction. From equation (21), one can
easily confirm that a decrease in φ reduces payoffs under open conflict: ∂U/∂(−φ) < 0.
When the labor constraint is not binding, there are two reinforcing effects. First, greater
destruction of open conflict, given arming, directly lowers expected current payoffs. Second,
an increase in destruction increases arming incentives in the current period and thus indirectly
lowers expected current payoffs. When the labor constraint binds, the negative indirect effect
vanishes, but the direct negative effect remains. Notice especially that the overall impact of
a decrease in φ on U contrasts sharply with its impact on V (i.e., ∂V/∂(−φ) > 0, due solely
to the indirect effect on arming under settlement, ∂Gs/∂(−φ) < 0). Fig. 2b illustrates the
shifts in the representative group’s payoffs caused by increases in the rate of destruction, for
∆ = 0, which implies that picmin is invariant to changes in φ.
4.3 A Welfare Comparison of Settlement and Conflict
We now ask how expected lifetime payoffs under settlement compare with those under open
conflict as they both depend on the relative price of oil, the shadow of the future and the
rate of destruction caused by open conflict. Recall that arming incentives are at least as large
under conflict as they are under settlement: Gc ≥ Gs and pic ≤ pis for all parameter values
and p. Of course if the labor constraint binds in the production of guns under both conflict
and settlement (i.e., when p ≥ pis), we have Gc = Gs. However, Gc = Gs also holds true when
the groups attach no value to the future and, at the same time, there is no destruction under
conflict (i.e., when ∆ = 0 and φ = 1). In this case, as pointed out earlier, pis = pic = pi0.
Accordingly, there is no essential distinction between conflict and settlement when ∆ = 0 and
φ = 1, so that V = U for all p. This special case serves as a useful benchmark. In all other
cases with p < pis, there is relatively less arming under settlement (Gs < Gc) and, moreover,
the labor constraint in the production of guns binds at a lower price under conflict than it
does under settlement (pic < pis).
Subtracting (19) from (12) and then simplifying the resulting expression gives
V − U = µ(p)
[









Equation (22) shows that the payoff under settlement relative to that under conflict depends
on the relative quantity of arms produced under these two methods of conflict resolution
appropriately discounted over the infinite time horizon and the gross amount of labor and
land not destroyed when the groups both choose settlement over open conflict.
To develop some valuable intuition, we start by asking how payoffs would compare if there
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were no destruction (and thus no surplus) but the groups attached some value to the future
(i.e., φ = 1 and ∆ > 0). One can verify that pic = pi
0
1+∆ < pi
0 = pis in this case. Applying
these observations to equation (22), along with the solutions for arming under settlement and
conflict respectively shown in equations (18) and (11), gives
(V − U)|φ=1 = µ(p) [Gc −Gs(1 + ∆)]
=

0 for p ≤ pic
−µ(p)L [p− pic] (1+∆)
pi0
for pic < p < pis
−µ(p)L∆ for pis ≤ p.
(23)
As the expression above shows, the possibility that the labor constraint binds in the produc-
tion of arms under the two methods of conflict resolution influences the ranking of settlement
and conflict in a non-trivial way: (V − U)|φ=1 = 0 for p ≤ pic, whereas (V − U)|φ=1 < 0 for
p > pic. The intuition is as follows. The assumption of no destruction (φ = 1) implies no
(gross) land and labor surplus to share under settlement, leaving only the difference in the
welfare costs of arming. Under conflict, this cost is the reduction of income in the current
period appropriately adjusted by the marginal utility of income, which is just µ(p)Gc. Under
settlement, this cost is the present value of expending Gs in the current and future periods
again appropriately adjusted by the marginal utility of income, which is just µ(p)Gs(1 + ∆).
As one can easily confirm, for all p ≤ pic when φ = 1, Gc = (1 + ∆)Gs, implying no difference
in payoffs under conflict and settlement. However, when p increases entering the (pic, pis)
price interval, Gs increases while Gc = L remains unchanged, implying that the payoff under
settlement falls relative to that under conflict, V < U . When p ≥ pis the resource constraint
becomes binding under settlement for every period. Thus, although Gs = Gc = L in the
current period so that current welfare costs from arming are identical under conflict and
settlement, there is no arming under conflict in future periods, implying again that V < U .
We now consider the welfare implications of increasing the rate of destruction (given
∆ > 0) with the help of Fig. 3. This figure assumes that ∆ > 0 and shows the payoffs that
arise under conflict and settlement for several values of φ, including the case of no destruction
(φ = 1). The payoff functions associated with φ = 1, depicted by the solid curves V and U
in the figure, illustrate our results above that V = U for p ≤ pic, whereas V < U for p > pic.
Now let us consider a small increase in the rate of destruction (a fall in φ from 1 to φ′).
From our earlier discussion, we know that the fall in φ will cause V to rise and U to fall.
The resulting payoffs are depicted in the figure as V ′ (> V ) and U ′ (< U), which intersect
at points B and C. Denote the prices associated with these points by pi (φ,∆) and pi (φ,∆),
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respectively. With some tedious algebra, one can confirm,
pi (φ,∆) =
(1 + φ)pi0
2 [−1 + φ (1 + φ+ ∆)] , (24a)
pi (φ,∆) =
∆pi0
2 (1− φ) . (24b)
When p ∈ [pi, pi], open conflict weakly dominates settlement; and, when p /∈ [pi, pi], settlement
strictly dominates open conflict. Additional reductions in φ (for example, from φ′ to φ′′) shift
payoffs under settlement up (to V ′′ > V ′) and shift payoffs under conflict down (to U ′′ < U ′),





, depicted by point E in Fig. 3, at a unique φ̂(∆) ∈ (0, 1), which is given by
φ̂(∆) = 12
[√
4 + ∆2 −∆
]
. (25)















2 + ∆−√4 + ∆2 .
Building on the results above, we have
Proposition 1 (Payoffs under Conflict and Settlement). For any ∆ ∈ [0,∞), there exists
a threshold rate of destruction φ̂(∆) that is decreasing in ∆ and satisfies φ̂(0) = 1 and
lim∆→∞ φ̂ = 0. The payoff functions under conflict and settlement, each evaluated at their
respective arming solutions, can be compared as functions of p, φ and ∆:
(a) If ∆ = 0 and φ = 1, then U (p, φ,∆) = V (p, φ,∆) for all p > 0.
(b) If ∆ > 0 and φ = 1, then
◦ U (p, φ,∆) = V (p, φ,∆) for all p ≤ pic, and
◦ U (p, φ,∆) > V (p, φ,∆) for all p > pic.
(c) If ∆ > 0 and φ ∈ [φ̂(∆), 1), then there exist two critical values of the price, pi(φ,∆)
that is increasing in φ and pi(φ,∆) that is decreasing in φ with pi(φ,∆) ≤ pi(φ,∆), such
that
◦ U (p, φ,∆) ≥ V (p, φ,∆) for p ∈ [pi, pi] (with equality at pi and pi); and
◦ U (p, φ,∆) < V (p, φ,∆) for p ∈ (0, pi) ∪ (pi,∞).
(d) If ∆ > 0 and φ ∈ (0, φ̂(∆)), then U (p, φ,∆) < V (p, φ,∆) for all p > 0.
(e) As ∆ increases, the range of possible values of φ that imply V (p, φ,∆) > U (p, φ,∆) for
all p (part d) shrinks, and the set of prices that imply V (p, φ,∆) > U (p, φ,∆) when
φ ≥ φ̂(∆) (part c) also shrinks.
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This proposition shows the intuitive roles played by the rate of destruction (1 − φ) and
the shadow of the future (∆) in the ranking of payoffs as has been established in the previous
literature (e.g., McBride and Skaperdas, 2007, 2014), but also shows how this intuition is
conditioned on trade or more precisely world prices. To start, part (a) focuses on our bench-
mark case where no value is attached to future single-period payoffs and open conflict is not
destructive (∆ = 0 and φ = 1). Since the resource allocations are identical under settlement
and conflict, these two methods of conflict resolution yield identical expected lifetime payoffs.
Building on that benchmark case, part (b) isolates the significance of the shadow of the future
for our welfare comparisons, showing that when there is no destruction, a larger shadow of the
future tilts the balance in favor of conflict for sufficiently high prices that imply the resource
constraint in the production of arms binds under conflict and thus induce specialization in
the production of oil for the winning group. Parts (a) and (b) taken together confirm our
intuition, that as long as there is no destruction and thus no surplus to split, conflict weakly
Pareto dominates settlement for all prices.
Parts (c), (d) and (e) neatly characterize the circumstances under which one method of
conflict resolution Pareto dominates the other in payoffs depending on the relative price of oil,
the rate of destruction for φ < 1, and the shadow of the future for ∆ > 0. For given ∆ > 0,
decreases in φ below 1 reduce and eventually eliminate (for φ ≤ φ̂(∆)) the range of prices
under which conflict generates a strictly higher payoff than settlement, (pi(φ,∆), pi(φ,∆)).
Thus, as stated in part (d) of the proposition, settlement strictly Pareto dominates conflict
for all prices if the rate of destruction is sufficiently high (i.e., φ < φ̂(∆). But, as stated in
part (c), even when φ ≥ φ̂(∆), settlement Pareto dominates conflict at sufficiently low and
sufficiently high prices, precisely when we expect the gains from trade to be very high.32 To
gain some intuition for this result, observe that as p approaches zero, arming under both
conflict and settlement approach zero, implying that the only difference in payoffs is due
to the strictly positive surplus enjoyed by the two groups under settlement, but not under
conflict. Conversely, as p approaches ∞, the constraint on labor binds under both conflict
and settlement so that Gc = Gs = L. Although the costs of insecurity are repeatedly incurred
in the future under settlement but not under conflict, the value of the labor savings realized
under conflict in terms of butter goes to zero. Finally, part (e) points out, consistent with our
intuition, that increases in the strength of the shadow of the future, given some destruction
(φ < 1), tend to increase the relative ex ante appeal of conflict.
5 When Is Settlement Feasible?
The results of the previous section indicate that peaceful settlement could Pareto dominate
conflict as it allows the groups to divide the disputed land without incurring the destructive
32Note especially, limp→0 U/V = limp→∞ U/V = φ+∆1+∆ < 1 for all φ ∈ (0, 1).
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effects of conflict. Clearly, an increase in the rate of destruction (all else the same) tends
to increase settlement’s relative appeal. However, this benefit is not sufficient to predict the
emergence of settlement, particularly when the dispute over land is ongoing and the shadow
of the future is large. Indeed, as argued above, conflict is always a subgame perfect, Nash
equilibrium.
Our primary objective in this section is to characterize the conditions that ensure settle-
ment is another possible subgame perfect, Nash equilibrium. One might naturally approach
this problem by examining the groups’ second-stage choice of whether to settle peacefully
or to declare war given the choice of guns in the initial stage by comparing V (G,G) with
U(G,G). Of course, a necessary condition for settlement to possibly emerge in equilibrium
is that V (G,G) > U(G,G) when evaluated at the arming choices made in the first stage
in anticipation of settlement in the second stage, G = Gs. However, this condition is not
sufficient. In particular, even if V (Gs, Gs) > U(Gs, Gs) holds, each group i could have an
incentive to deviate unilaterally from settlement given the opponent’s choice Gj = Gs (j 6= i),
by choosing in the first stage another level of arms, denoted by Gi = Gd, and then choosing
open conflict in the second stage, such that U(Gd, Gs) > V (Gs, Gs).33 The necessary and
sufficient condition for settlement to be another possible subgame perfect, Nash equilibrium
is that such unilateral deviations are not profitable—i.e., U(Gd, Gs) < V (Gs, Gs)
5.1 Optimizing Deviations and Expected Payoffs
To proceed, let Bc(Gj) denote group i’s best-response function in anticipation of choosing














for Gj > 0,
where pic = φφ+∆pi
0 denotes the threshold value of the relative price of oil above which group
i’s labor constraint binds when both groups arm in anticipation of open conflict. Obviously,
the analogous critical value under the deviation depends on Gj . But, we are interested in
studying deviation incentives when Gj = Gs. As such, our analysis to follow is based on the
best-response function when evaluated at Gj = Gs.
33That is to say, since this latter sort of deviation for either group i involves both a choice of open conflict
in the second stage and an optimizing departure from the arming solution under settlement Gd in the first
stage, given the opponent’s choice of Gj = Gs, it necessarily yields a (weakly) higher payoff than the former
deviation that involves only choosing conflict over settlement given Gi = Gj = Gs: U(Gd, Gs) ≥ U(Gs, Gs).
Only in the special case where the resource constraint binds in the production of guns under the deviation
and under settlement (so that Gd = Gs = L) are the two deviations identical, yielding identical payoffs.
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Letting pid denote the relevant critical value of the price under the deviation, we have




for p ≤ pid
L for p > pid,
(26)




pis/pic−1 and, as previously defined, pi
s = 1+φ2φ pi
0. Note that in our benchmark
case where ∆ = 0 and φ = 1, all of the critical values of the price converge to the same value:
pic = pid = pis = pi0. More generally, when ∆ > 0 and φ < 1, pic < pid < pis holds. Thus, we
have Gd ∈ [Gs, Gc]. To be more precise, observe the following rankings of arming along with
the implied values of qi(Gd, Gs) from equations (2), (18), and (26), as they depend on the
prevailing relative price of oil:
(i) p ∈ (0, pid) ⇒ Gs < Gd < Gc ≤ L⇒ qi = pis
pis+pid
;
(ii) p ∈ (pid, pis)⇒ Gs < Gd = Gc = L⇒ qi = pispis+p ; and,
(iii) p ∈ (pis,∞)⇒ Gs = Gd = Gc = L⇒ qi = 12 .
Then, with the solution for Gd in equation (26) and the expected payoff function under
conflict (9), one can derive the expected lifetime payoff to group i that unilaterally deviates
from Gi = Gs in the first stage and chooses conflict in the second, which we denote by
W ≡ U(Gd, Gs):
W =











for p ≤ pid
W2 = µ(p)L
[




for pid < p < pis
W3 = µ(p)L
[
∆ + 2φ ppic
]
for pis ≤ p.
(27)
Thus, the expected lifetime payoff obtained by a group that optimally deviates from the
settlement outcome consists of three segments depending on the relative price of oil.
5.2 A Comparison of Payoffs under the Optimizing Deviation and Settlement
The necessary and sufficient condition for peaceful settlement to be a subgame perfect, Nash
equilibrium is that V ≡ V (Gs, Gs) ≥ U(Gd, Gs) ≡ W . To analyze this condition, we first
return to our benchmark case, where groups attach no value to the future and conflict is
non-destructive (i.e., ∆ = 0 and φ = 1). In this case, since pic = pid = pis = pi0, there are
only two distinct segments for W—namely, W1 and W3 corresponding respectively to when
p < pis and p ≥ pis. What is more, since there are no differences in the allocation of resources
under conflict and settlement in this benchmark case, we have W = U = V for all p > 0.
Next, suppose that the groups attach some value to the future, but continue to suppose
that conflict is non-destructive (i.e., ∆ ∈ (0,∞) and φ = 1). One can confirm, using equations
22
(27) and (21), that W > U for all p ∈ (0, pis) whereas W = U for all p ∈ [pis,∞). Then, from
Proposition 1(b), keeping in mind that pic < pis, we have that W > V for all p > 0. Even
though U = V for p < pic when there is no destruction and the groups value the future, each
group has a strictly positive incentive to deviate unilaterally from the settlement outcome.
Hence, in this case, conflict is the unique subgame perfect, Nash equilibrium.
But, what happens when conflict is destructive (φ < 1)? Inspection of (27) reveals that
the dependence of W on the relative price of oil is non-monotonic. Note especially that,
depending on the values of ∆ and φ, W need not be quasi-convex in p for p ∈ (pid, pis). Thus,
precisely characterizing the relationship between W and V for alternative values of prices,
discount factors and rates of destruction is quite complicated.
To begin our analysis, we define D ≡ W/V as the relative profitability for group i to


































The following lemma identifies several interesting benchmark results that help develop some
intuition:
Lemma 1 Suppose ∆ ∈ (0,∞) and φ ∈ (0, 1). Then,
(a) limp→0W (p, φ,∆) = limp→0 U(p, φ,∆).
(b) W (p, φ,∆) ≥ U (p, φ,∆) for all p and with equality for p ≥ pis.
(c) limp→0D (p, φ,∆) = limp→∞D (p, φ,∆) = φ+∆1+∆ < 1.
(d) limp→pis−
∂D
∂p < 0 and limp→pis+
∂D
∂p < 0.
(e) D(pis, φ,∆) T 1 if φ T φ̂(∆).
Part (a) follows readily from equations (21) and (27). This result makes sense, because
as p goes to zero, arming under conflict, settlement and the deviation converge to zero. Since
both conflict and the deviation imply identical security costs as well as identical probabilities
(equal to 12) of taking full control of the disputed land (φT in the initial period and T in all
future periods), the payoffs must be the same.
Part (b), which similarly follows from equations (21) and (27), also makes sense. When
p ≥ pis, the labor constraint is binding not only under the optimizing deviation but also when
both groups expect either settlement or conflict and arm accordingly. Thus, arming and thus
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the security costs under the deviation and under conflict are identical: Gs = Bc(Gs) = Gd =
Gc = L. Furthermore, the probability of winning the dispute over land under the deviation
and conflict are the same and equal to 12 . As such, they yield equal identical expected lifetime
payoffs. When p < pis, the labor constraint does not bind under settlement, implying that
the optimal deviation involves security costs that are no greater than those under conflict:
Gs < Bc(Gs) = Gd ≤ Gc. But, whether Gd < Gc or Gd = Gc, the optimal deviation gives
a strictly greater probability of taking full control over the disputed land than that under
conflict (q(Gd, Gs) > q(Gc, Gc) = 12), thereby yielding strictly higher expected payoffs.
Part (c) follows from parts (a) and (b) and our earlier comparison of conflict and settle-
ment payoffs when prices take on extreme values.34 Thus, when prices are very low or very
high, settlement dominates conflict and, moreover, there exist no incentives to deviate from
settlement. However, because there exists a range of prices under which optimal deviations
yield higher expected payoffs relative to conflict (specifically, W > U for p ∈ (0, pis) as pointed
out in part (b)), settlement could fail to be a stable equilibrium for (at least) some prices
values under which settlement Pareto dominate open conflict (V > U).
This possibility reveals itself a little more clearly with the next two parts of Lemma 1.
Although one can see from (28) that, in general, D is non-monotonic in p, part (d) states
that D is decreasing in p for prices in the neighborhood of pis.35 Moreover, part (e) indicates
that W exceeds or falls short of V at pis depending on whether φ is greater than or less than
φ̂(∆), shown in equation (25).36 Now suppose φ = φ̂(∆). Fig. 4 shows the implied V and
U curves which, for reasons argued earlier, meet each other at point B where p = pis(φ̂(∆)).
Thus, as shown in the figure, V ≥ U holds for all p > 0 and as an equality for p = pis(φ̂(∆)).
Furthermore, as shown in the figure, W = V at p = pis (as implied by part (e) of the lemma).
Then, parts (c) and (d), suggest that there exists at least one price pi ∈ (0, pis) such that
D > 1 for all p ∈ (pi, pis).37 This implication is illustrated in Fig 4, showing that, for the
range of prices associated with interval AB, the optimal deviation is profitable. Thus, even
though settlement weakly dominates conflict in this case (i.e., φ = φ̂(∆)), there exists a range
of prices that precludes settlement from being a stable equilibrium.
34See especially footnote 32.
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37Note that Fig. 4 is drawn under the assumption that pismin = arg minp V1 < pi
s. However, this assumption
is not necessary for the result in view of part (d) of the lemma.
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The above raises the question of whether there exists a threshold level of φ (< φ̂(∆)),
such that V > W for all p > 0 if φ is below that threshold. The answer to this question
depends on the value of ∆ as stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Payoffs under the Optimal Deviation and Settlement). There exists a crit-
ical value of ∆, denoted by ∆˜, such that if ∆ ∈ (0, ∆˜), then there exists a threshold value of
φ, φ˜(∆) < φ̂(∆), that divides the parameter space as follows:
(a) If φ ∈ [φ˜(∆), 1), then there exist two critical values of the price, pi(φ,∆) and pi(φ,∆)
with pi ≤ pi such that
◦ W (p, φ,∆) ≥ V (p, φ,∆) for p ∈ [pi, pi] (with equality at pi and pi); and
◦ W (p, φ,∆) < V (p, φ,∆) for p ∈ (0, pi) ∪ (pi,∞).
(b) If φ ∈ (0, φ˜(∆)), then W (p, φ,∆) < V (p, φ,∆) for all p > 0.
If ∆ ∈ [∆˜,∞), then there exists no threshold value of φ, such that φ below that values implies
settlement is a stable equilibrium for all p > 0.
Thus, provided that the groups do not attach too much weight to the future, settlement
could be a feasible equilibrium outcome for all p > 0 when the rate of destruction is not too
low (or φ is not too high). Note that, since φ˜(∆) < φ̂(∆), the condition for settlement to
be feasible for all p > 0 is stronger than the condition for settlement to be Pareto preferred
given ∆ ∈ (0, ∆˜). Even when the rate of destruction is too low to ensure that the deviation
is not profitable for all p > 0, settlement could emerge as a stable equilibrium as long as p is
sufficiently high or low.
What happens when ∆ ∈ [∆˜,∞)? Again, it depends on the actual value of ∆. In
particular, there exists another critical value for ∆,
˜˜





∆,∞), with the following properties:
(i) If ∆ ∈ [∆˜, ˜˜∆), then there exists a range of moderate values of φ, such that if φ falls
within that range, then V > W for all p > 0. For extreme values of φ, V > W holds
only for extreme values of p.
(ii) If ∆ ∈ ( ˜˜∆,∞], then there exists no value of φ for which V > W for all p > 0. For ∆ in
this highest range, V > W holds only for extreme values of p.
Although it is possible to provide more precise characterization results for each of these two
cases, for simplicity here we illustrate what happens in each of the three cases, including the
one characterized in Proposition 2, with Fig. 5.
This figure includes three panels, each corresponding to one of the three different ranges
of ∆ identified above. We start with low values of ∆—i.e., those in (0, ∆˜)—and gradually
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consider higher values. The vertical axis in each panel measures φ, whereas the horizontal
axis measures p. Each of the curves represents combinations of φ and p, conditioned on ∆,
for which D = W/V = 1.
Consider the middle dashed (pink) curve in panel (a) corresponding to an intermediate
value of ∆ (∆′) within the relevant range. Now consider the relatively low value of destruction
(φ > φ̂(∆′)) corresponding to the (black) horizontal line in the figure. That horizontal line
intersects the middle dashed (pink) curve at two points, defining two critical values of the
price, pi(φ,∆′) and pi(φ,∆′). In particular, the part of the horizontal line that lies above the
curve represents the (moderate) range of prices, p ∈ (pi, pi), that cannot sustain settlement,
whereas the parts of the horizontal line that lie below the curve represent the (extreme) values
of the price, p ∈ (0, pi) ∪ (pi,∞), that can sustain settlement in equilibrium. As destruction
increases (φ falls given ∆ = ∆′), the corresponding price ranges that sustain settlement
expand. Note especially the minimum of the dashed (pink) curve, shown at φ = φ˜(∆′). Values
of φ below this minimum (reflecting relatively high rates of destruction) imply settlement is
a stable equilibrium for all p > 0.
Next, consider the lower solid (blue) curve that is associated with a larger (but still
relatively small) value of ∆—i.e., ∆′′ ∈ (∆′, ∆˜). This curve and the price ranges it generates
show a certain monotonicity between the range of prices that sustain settlement and φ and
∆. Specifically, for this slightly higher value of ∆, the union of the sets of prices that sustain
settlement is relatively smaller for any given rate of destruction φ, but is once again increasing
in the rate of destruction (1 − φ). By the same token, the threshold value of φ associated
∆′′ > ∆′ is lower than that assuming ∆′: φ˜(∆′′) < φ˜(∆′). Conversely, the smaller is ∆
within the interval under consideration (consider, for example, the highest dotted (green)
curve associated with ∆ < ∆′), the larger are the unions of the two extreme set of prices that
render settlement sustainable for any given φ > φ˜(∆) and the larger is the threshold value of
φ, φ˜(∆), below which settlement is sustainable for all p > 0.
Panel (b) shows that matters change considerably for intermediate values of ∆ ∈ [∆˜, ˜˜∆].
Let us start with the two dashed (pink) curves corresponding to ∆ = ∆′.38 When φ is
relatively high (low), the relevant curve of the two is the U-shaped (inverse U-shaped) one.
Now consider the horizontal line drawn in the figure for a relatively high value of φ. Its
intersection with a given U-shaped curve pins down the critical values of p (given ∆′), which
define the sets of (extreme) prices that render settlement a possible equilibrium outcome, as
well as the set of (moderate) prices that preclude the emergence of settlement as a stable
equilibrium.
When we consider very low rates of destruction (high values of φ) given the same value of
38Keep in mind that the value of ∆′ assumed in panel (b) is greater than that for the middle (pink) curve
drawn in panel (a).
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∆ = ∆′, the intersection of the relevant horizontal and the dashed (pink) inverse U-shaped
curve once again gives the critical values of p, which define the range of (moderate) prices
that preclude settlement from being an equilibrium and the ranges of extreme prices that
can support settlement. The key difference here is that higher rates of destruction (or lower
values of φ) imply not a larger but a smaller union of sets of prices that sustain settlement
as an equilibrium. Indeed, there exists a range of intermediate values of destruction (φ),
depending on the value of ∆ within the range under consideration in panel (b), that implies
settlement is a stable equilibrium for all possible prices. This range is illustrated in Fig. 5b
by (φ˜2(∆′), φ˜1(∆′)). Even so, the figure shows generally that a smaller shadow of the future
∆ ∈ (∆˜, ˜˜∆) implies a greater set of prices that render settlement a stable equilibrium.
Panel (c), which is based on still larger values of ∆, ∆ ∈ ( ˜˜∆,∞), can be interpreted
similarly. We make two noteworthy observations. First, like the case where ∆ ∈ (∆˜, ˜˜∆) as
shown in panel (b), panel (c) indicates that the relationship between φ and the range of prices
that sustain settlement is non-monotonic. In particular, lower rates of destruction (higher φ)
can induce a smaller set of prices that support settlement as long as the rate of destruction is
initially low (consider the higher horizontal line in Fig. 5(c) drawn at a relatively higher value
of φ). However, when the rate of destruction is initially high (consider the lower horizontal
line in Fig. 5(c) drawn at a relatively lower value of φ), a lower rate of destruction (an
increase in φ) can induce a larger range of prices of prices that sustain settlement. Second,
panel (c) shows, when the shadow of the future is sufficiently large (∆ ∈ ( ˜˜∆,∞)), there is no
longer any value of φ that implies settlement can emerge as an equilibrium for all possible
prices. Nevertheless, even in this case, a smaller shadow of the future implies a larger set of
prices that can sustain settlement.
Despite the complexities of our results, one tendency stands out: a larger shadow of the
future, all else the same, makes it more likely that conflict will be the unique subgame perfect,
Nash equilibrium, even when settlement Pareto dominates conflict. This result contrasts
sharply with Folk-theorem type arguments based on repeated static games (e.g., Friedman,
1971), which suggest that a sufficiently large shadow of the future can support cooperation
and be welfare-enhancing. However, it is not surprising in the current structurally dynamic
setting where fighting today has the long-term benefit of reducing the future need to arm.
One might naturally wonder whether the pattern of trade matters for the determination
of whether or not settlement is sustainable in equilibrium. As it turns out, we cannot offer
a general answer to that question. However, it is important to observe, from our analysis
and discussion revolving around Fig. 5 as well as Lemma 1(c), that settlement is always
a possible subgame perfect, Nash equilibrium given there is some destruction associated
with open conflict and the relative price of the good produced intensively with the disputed
resource (oil) is extremely high or low. For such extreme values of the price of oil, we expect
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the gains from trade to be the highest.
6 Trade Openness and Equilibrium Payoffs
Building on our findings above, we now turn to explore how changes in trade costs can
influence equilibrium outcomes, depending on the other parameters of interest—most notably,
the destructiveness of open conflict (1− φ). This analysis provides new insights into the link
between trade openness and the risk of violent domestic conflict and, more generally, into the
possible welfare consequences of increased trade openness in our setting.
6.1 Prices and Equilibrium Payoffs
We lay the groundwork for this analysis, by studying the influence of the price of oil p on
equilibrium payoffs. Of course, as argued above, open conflict is always a subgame perfect,
Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we have shown that, while there are some circumstances
under which open conflict is the only stable equilibrium, there are other circumstances under
which settlement is another possible stable equilibrium. In what follows, we suppose that, for
parameter values which imply both conflict and settlement are possible stable equilibria, the
groups “select” the more efficient of the two.39 Taking this perspective, it is obvious from our
analysis above that continuous changes in p affect payoffs not only in a continuous manner
as they influence the terms of trade and the incentives to arm. They can also affect payoffs
in a discontinuous manner, as they can induce a discrete change in the method of conflict
resolution, from open conflict to peaceful settlement or vice versa.
Fig. 6 illustrates these effects assuming a relatively small shadow of the future as empha-
sized in Proposition 2 (i.e., ∆ ∈ (0, ∆˜)) for various values of φ, the rate of destruction. The
dashed (pink) line in each panel shows the payoff under settlement, V ; the solid (blue) line
shows the payoff under open conflict U ; and, the dotted (green) line shows the hypothetical
payoff under the optimizing deviation, W . Notice that in each panel, W = U for p ≥ pis
where the labor constraint on the production of arms binds in under settlement, conflict and
the deviation.40 Most importantly, the thick, solid (red) line in each panel depicts the stable
and efficient equilibrium payoff as a function of p > 0.
Panel (a) illustrates the result stated in Proposition 2(b) that, if destruction is sufficiently
high (i.e., φ < φ˜(∆) < φ̂(∆)), settlement is feasible as well as Pareto dominant for all p > 0.
39Note that this “selection” is consistent with Bernheim et al.’s (1987) refinement of the equilibrium concept
of subgame perfection, “perfectly coalition-proof” equilibrium. In particular, when both peaceful settlement
and open conflict are subgame perfect, Nash equilibria, both are immune to unilateral deviations. However,
when in addition settlement Pareto dominates conflict, conflict is not (whereas settlement is) immune to
coalitional deviations.
40Observe also in the figure that, as noted earlier, W need not be quasi-convex for p < pis. The possible
non-quasi-convexity of W holds more precisely for p ∈ (pid, pis), but pid is not shown in the figure. For now
ignore the positioning of pnA. That becomes important in our upcoming discussion of trade openness.
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As discussed earlier, an increase in p changes the terms of trade, the sign of which depends
on where p is in relation to the trade-eliminating price under settlement, psA. In particular,
for p < psA an increase in p implies a deterioration in the terms of trade, whereas for p ≥ psA
the terms of trade improves with increases in p. However, for all p ∈ (0, pis) an increase in p
increases the incentive to arm in the current and in every future period , thereby implying
higher security costs. Thus, as argued earlier in Section 4.1, the equilibrium payoff in this
case is strictly quasi-convex in p, reaching a minimum at p = pismin > p
s
A (not shown), where
the increase in the gains from trade equals the increase in security costs. But, because
V > W ≥ U for all p > 0, there are no discrete changes (jumps or drops) in the equilibrium
payoff when p changes continuously.
With a lower rate of destruction, however, matters differ, as shown in panel (b) which
assumes φ′ ∈ (φ˜(∆), φ̂(∆)). Specifically, from Proposition 2(a), settlement is no longer a
stable equilibrium for all p > 0. An increase in p from an initially low value (< pi(φ′,∆))
causes payoffs to decrease continuously along V ; but, as p increases beyond pi(φ′,∆) (associ-
ated with point A in the figure), payoffs drop sharply—precisely where settlement becomes
unstable (W > V ). The discontinuity in payoffs arises here because the shift from settlement
to conflict implies a discrete increase in arming in the current period and the destruction
of resources that accompanies open conflict; although the switch from settlement to open
conflict also implies an added savings in future resources afforded by resolving the dispute
once and for all, this benefit is swamped by the two aforementioned added costs. Further
increases in p eventually lead to a jump in equilibrium payoffs at point B (associated with
p = pi(φ′,∆)), where settlement becomes stable again (V > W ). At this point, current
arming falls discretely and the destruction of resources is avoided; furthermore, this gain
more than offsets the higher future costs of arming that accompany settlement but not open
conflict.41 In any case, from Proposition 1(d) since φ′ < φ̂(∆), settlement Pareto dominates
open conflict for all p > 0. Thus, for intermediate values of the price, p ∈ (pi(φ′,∆), pi(φ′,∆))
such that settlement cannot be supported as an equilibrium outcome, the economy is stuck
in the “bad” equilibrium—namely, open conflict.
Finally, panel (c) shows what happens for an even lower rate of destruction, φ′′ > φ̂(∆).
From Proposition 1(c), such a value of φ implies there exists an intermediate range of prices
for which open conflict Pareto dominates peaceful settlement: p ∈ (pi(φ′′,∆), pi(φ′′,∆)). For
all other prices p /∈ (pi(φ′′,∆), pi(φ′′,∆)), settlement dominates open conflict. Thus, for
p ∈ (pi(φ′′,∆), pi(φ′′,∆)), the economy is once again stuck in the “bad” equilibrium; how-
ever, for p ∈ (pi(φ′′,∆), pi(φ′′,∆)), conflict emerges as the stable and Pareto dominant out-
41Note that, for the parameter values assumed to draw Fig. 6(b), pi(φ′,∆) < pis(φ′), which is what gives rise
to the discrete jump in payoffs as p rises above pi(φ′,∆). However, it is also possible that pi(φ′,∆) > pis(φ′), in
which case the transition from conflict to settlement would be “smoother.” This alternative possibility, which
necessarily arises when φ > φ̂(∆) (as argued below), is captured in panel (c) of the figure.
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come. It is important to notice the assumption underlying the figure that φ′′ > φ̂(∆) implies
pi(φ′′,∆) = pi(φ′′,∆), and furthermore that this common value is greater than pis(φ′′) as
shown in the figure.42 Hence, another important difference between panel (c) and panel (b)
is that the shift from conflict to settlement at p = pi(φ′′,∆) does not imply a discontinuous
jump in payoffs. Since pi(φ′′,∆) > pis(φ′′), current-period arming under settlement and con-
flict are identical at p = pi(φ′′,∆): Gs = Gc = L. The equality of the two payoffs (V = U)
at this price, then, reflects the equality of the welfare costs of conflict’s destructive effects
preempted by settlement in the current period and the welfare gains of the future savings
in resources afforded by conflict in the current period. As p rises further, the benefits of
avoiding destruction rise above the costs of a repeated diversion of productive resources to
arming in the future.
6.2 Trade Costs and Equilibrium Outcomes
As emphasized in the empirical literature, conflict can undermine the gains from external
trade by disrupting it. As such, the option to participate in world markets implies a higher
opportunity cost to fighting (as compared with settling). Although we do not explicitly
capture that opportunity cost here, an analysis of trade costs in our setting can shed new
light on this issue. Thus, with the groundwork laid out above, we now consider the possible
importance of barriers to trade or more precisely exogenous trade costs in influencing the
conditions that make settlement a possible equilibrium outcome.43 In view of the complexities
that arise in characterizing those conditions generally as they depend on p, φ and ∆, we
maintain our focus on the case emphasized in Proposition 2—namely, that the shadow of the
future is relatively small: ∆ ∈ (0, ∆˜).
Another potentially complicating factor is that whether the groups enter into open conflict
or settle their dispute over land peacefully matters for the pattern of trade given any price.
In general and as predicted by the traditional paradigm that abstracts from conflict, the
pattern of trade depends on how the relative price of oil compares with the country’s autarky
price. What differs and complicates our analysis here is that this (domestic) market clearing
price itself depends on whether the groups fight or not. As defined earlier, psA denotes the
autarky price when groups settle; pcA denotes the autarky price in the initial period when
they fight; and pnA denotes the autarky price in future periods when open conflict breaks out
42The reasoning is as follows. Recall from equations (24) and (25) that pi(φ,∆) = pis(φ) at φ = φ̂(∆), and
that an increase in φ increases pi(φ,∆) and decreases pis(φ). Since by assumption φ′′ > φ̂(∆), pi(φ′′,∆) >
pis(φ′′) holds true. Then, Lemma 1(b) implies W = U for p ≥ pi(φ′′,∆) > pis(φ′′). Since pi(φ′′,∆) gives the
critical value of p above which V ≥ U , pi(φ′′,∆) gives the threshold value of p above which V ≥ W , and
U = W , we necessarily have pi(φ′′,∆) = pi(φ′′,∆) > pis(φ′′).
43Of course, a more complete analysis would involve supposing that trade costs increase with the intensity
of conflict. We conjecture that incorporating such link would tend to make conflict less appealing, but would
leave our finding that conflict can Pareto dominate peaceful settlement intact.
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in the initial period.
Using equation (7), along with the solutions for arming in any given period (in the current
period under settlement Gs shown in equation (18), in the current period under fighting Gc
shown in equation (11), and in any future period after an initial one with fighting G = 0),
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A. Thus, for p
initially at some relatively low value (p < pcA), the country is a net importer of oil regardless
of how the dispute over land is resolved. As p enters the (pcA, p
s
A) range, the country becomes
a net exporter of oil in the current period under conflict, but continues to be a net importer
of oil in all future periods; yet for such prices under settlement, the country is a net importer
of oil in all periods. Further increases in p above psA imply that the country under settlement
is a net exporter of oil in all periods. Still, for such values of p < pnA, the country under
conflict continues to be a net importer of oil in all future periods. Finally, for p > pnA, the
country is always a net exporter of oil. These different possibilities suggest that reversals in
trade patterns can emerge as the world price of oil changes. Such reversals can arise simply
because the change in price influences the incentive to arm and thus the diversion of labor
resources away from the production of butter. However, a change in the price can also induce
a discrete change in the equilibrium mode of conflict resolution and that itself can reverse the
pattern of trade. In any case, these different possibilities can also complicate our analysis of
how trade costs matter.
To abstract from such complications, we suppose that the world price, now denoted by
pi, is strictly greater than the autarkic price under no arming, pnA, so that under free trade
the country is a net exporter of oil whether the groups settle or fight.44 Continuing to view
p as the internal or domestic price of oil for this country, we also assume that p > pnA,
so that p ∈ (pnA, pi). Thus, we limit our focus to trade costs that are consistent with a
strictly positive net export of oil. Any existing differences between pi and p reflect exogenous
44This assumption also rules out another possible complicating factor—namely, that there could be reversals
in trade patterns with changes in p (given pi) under the (hypothetical) optimizing deviation by one group.
It turns out that the autarky price that would emerge if one of the groups were to deviate from settlement,
whether or not the labor constraint binds in the production of arms for the deviating group, is always greater




A). Thus, limiting our attention to cases where pi > p
n
A is sufficient to ensure
that each group always expects to be a net exporter of oil.
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trade costs of the “iceberg” type that effectively “melt” traded goods in transit. Given
these simplifying assumptions implying that the country is always a net exporter of oil, our
analysis of the previous subsection can be applied directly to study the importance of trade
costs. Specifically, an increase (decrease) in p where initially p ∈ (pnA, pi) implies a decrease
(increase) in trade costs.
From Proposition 2(b), it should be clear that decreases in trade costs or equivalently
increases in p have no implications for the feasibility of settlement to emerge as an equilibrium
outcome when conflict is sufficiently destructive (i.e., φ < φ˜(∆)). However, observe from Fig.
6(a) that reductions in trade costs do matter for payoffs. In particular, provided pnA > pi
s
min,
increases in p above pnA cause payoffs to fall initially and then eventually to rise.
45 Thus,
even in the simplest of cases, globalization need not be welfare improving.
Now suppose that φ = φ′ ∈ (φ˜(∆), φ̂(∆)) and reconsider Fig. 6(b). From Propositions
1(d) and 2(a), settlement Pareto dominates open conflict for all p > 0, but can be supported
in equilibrium only for p /∈ (pi(φ′,∆), pi(φ′,∆)). Assuming that pnA < pi(φ′,∆), Fig. 6(b)
illustrates the possibility that the transition from high to lower trade costs could initially
render peaceful settlement unstable, in which case globalization would lead to a sharp decline
in welfare. However, as trade costs continue to fall, welfare rises along the payoff function
under conflict, U . Assuming, in addition, that the world price is sufficiently high (i.e.,
pi > pi(φ′,∆)), continued reductions in trade costs to zero eventually reestablish settlement
as a stable equilibrium and further improve payoffs. This same sort of effect is illustrated in
Fig. 6(c), similarly assuming that pi > pi(φ′′,∆).46
The different panels in Fig. 6 illustrate that the welfare consequences of increased trade
openness, in the form of a decrease in trade costs, are highly conditioned on conflict’s de-
structive effects.47 Consistent with the empirical findings of Martin et al. (2008), we find
that a decrease in trade costs can induce open conflict and thus be welfare-deteriorating, par-
ticularly when conflict’s destructive effects are relatively small (panels (b) and (c)); however,
depending on the initial degree of trade openness as well as conflict’s destructive effects, a
decrease in trade costs can also induce a switch from open conflict to settlement.





pi0]. Since pnA <
α(1+φ)
2β
pi0 holds unambiguously given conflict is not
completely destructive (φ > 0), a sufficient condition for a reduction in trade costs to be initially welfare-
reducing in this exercise is that pnA < pi
s or equivalently that α not be too large (α < (1 + φ)/(2 + φ)).
46We could also consider tariffs, but would have to modify the analysis to account for tariff revenues in
the determination of national income. Nevertheless, we anticipate that the analysis would not change much.
Trade liberalization (a decrease in tariffs), like globalization (a decrease in transportation costs) could enhance
or lead to a deterioration of welfare due to its (discrete) effect on the condition for peaceful settlement to be
a possible subgame perfect, Nash equilibrium, as well as its effects on arming incentives (and, of course, the
standard reduction in deadweight losses).
47Though not analyzed here, it should be obvious, from our analysis in Section 5.2, that the welfare conse-
quences of a decrease in trade costs also depend on the shadow of the future.
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7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed open conflict and peaceful settlement, each as a means along
with arming for groups within a single nation to “resolve” their dispute over a contested
resource (land). Peaceful settlement involves a division of that insecure resource, supported
by the arms chosen by the groups before coming to the negotiation table, without having to
suffer the sort of destruction that invariably comes with fighting. As others have found in
different settings, a higher rate of destruction associated with open conflict, then, tends to
make settlement relatively more appealing in an ex ante sense. However, because settlement
resolves only the current-period dispute, the groups find themselves in the same dispute in
the future and that requires the allocation of future resources to arming. Open conflict, by
contrast, is destructive, but it also allows the contending groups to resolve their dispute once
and for all, so that no future resources are allocated to arming. Consistent with the findings
of others, as the future becomes more salient, the value of this savings increases and the ex
ante relative appeal of open conflict tends to rise.
We find that, in addition to conflict’s rate of destruction and the strength of the shadow
of the future, the world price of the good produced intensively with the disputed resource
can matter too, suggesting that trade can play a central role in determining which method of
conflict resolution Pareto dominates the other. Interestingly, we find that, all else the same,
settlement is most likely to be preferred ex ante precisely under the conditions when the gains
from trade are largest—namely, when the price of oil takes on extremely high or low values.
Of course, the condition that ensures the Pareto dominance of peaceful settlement does
not ensure that settlement is, in addition to open conflict, a possible subgame perfect, Nash
equilibrium. The price of oil, the rate of destruction under conflict and the shadow of the
future all matter in determining the profitability of unilateral deviations from settlement; and,
as such, these parameters matter in determining whether settlement is possibly another stable
equilibrium. We find that the conditions for settlement to be sustained as an equilibrium
outcome are generally stronger and a bit more complex than the conditions for settlement to
be Pareto dominant.
Because the analysis is based on a number of simplifying assumptions, one might naturally
ask if the results are robust to relaxing them. The assumption that conflict’s destructive
effects are temporary, for example, tends to make conflict relatively more appealing. But, as
noted earlier, assuming instead that these effects are permanent tends to simplify the analysis
and sharpen the central results. In particular, we find that the condition for settlement to
be a possible stable equilibrium looks more like the condition for settlement to be Pareto
dominant, even though stronger, for all possible values of the shadow of the future, not just
small values.
Clearly, our assumptions regarding the nature of the strategic advantage conferred on
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the winner of open conflict are strong, and tend to tilt the balance in favor of conflict over
settlement. However, these assumptions, too, can be relaxed. One possibility, explored
by McBride and Skaperdas (2007), involves assuming that the strategic advantage in future
conflict can be realized by a group only after having won a certain number of battles. Another
possibility would be to suppose that conflict does not “resolve” the dispute over land once and
for all, but only for a finite number of periods. Yet, another approach would be to continue to
suppose that open conflict in the first period precludes the possibility of future open conflict
and thus future destruction, but also suppose that open conflict calls into play, for all future
periods, a different rule of division of the disputed resource, one that requires both groups
to arm while giving the victor of the first-period conflict at least some advantage in future
disputes. Although any of these alternative, less extreme assumptions would tend to tilt the
balance back in favor of peaceful settlement, the central results should not be affected.
The government, though not explicitly modeled here, can play a meaningful role in this
setting that could be explored in future research. One extension would involve considering
the possibility that the government uses trade policy (either trade liberalization or trade
protection) to influence arming incentives as well as the nature of equilibrium. Interestingly,
a welfare-minded policymaker could very well opt for policies that result in overt conflict.
Conversely, and depending on the environment in which they operate, governments might
view trade agreements as commitments that deter internal conflict.
A perhaps more obvious extension would be to consider the government’s role in strength-
ening the institutions of governance and enforcement to enhance the security of claims to the
nation’s resources. Currently, there are many ongoing civil wars that are costly and rooted
in natural resources.48 A central finding of our analysis is that, in the absence of effective
governance and sufficient state capacity, neither a larger shadow of the future nor a more
liberal trade regime will necessarily reduce the risk of open conflict. Thus, following McBride
et al. (2011) and Garfinkel et al. (2012), one could extend the analysis by supposing the
government makes costly long-term investments that render some fraction of the disputed
resource secure. We conjecture that, as the fraction of land that is contestable falls, the sever-
ity of conflict falls too, and peaceful settlement becomes a more viable method to resolve the
(remaining) conflict. However, to the extent that governance and enforcement are imperfect
so that some amount of the nation’s land remains contestable, open conflict cannot be ruled
out as a possible equilibrium.
48See, for example, Ross (2003).
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Figure 1: Settlement Payoffs under Alternative Discount Factor
















Figure 2a: Conflict Payoffs under Alternative Discount Factor Values









































Figure 3: Conflict and Settlement Payoff Comparisons under 
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